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Abstract 
 
Herbert A. Simon is widely known for his studies on rationality, artificial intelligence and 
for his pioneering approach to organizational studies. In one of his latest works, he 
presented a theory of human interaction, focused on the conflict between the selfish and the 
altruistic that can be seen as the essence of human relationships. The model is quite 
ambiguous: (1) it follows a kind of social Darwinism that (2) postulates selfish individuals’ 
extinction. Taking up Simon’s hypotheses on altruism, docility, and selfish behavior, we 
develop an alternative model of human interaction. The main objective of the paper is to 
show that rejecting neo-Darwinism and assuming slight complications in the model can 
explain more in terms of social system interactions. We assume that docility and then 
altruism, in a technical sense, is the basis of social interaction as it shapes the whole 
system. It is worth noting that, in the model, selfish individuals do not disappear. 
 
Key words: docility, altruism, social system, bounded rationality, social interactions, social 
Darwinism 
 
 
 
1. The problem of altruism 
This paper analyzes a model of social systems that is developed on the basis of one of 
Herbert A. Simon’s later ideas (1990; 1993).
1 The model here outlined tries to explain 
the interactions between selfish and altruist individuals. 
The word “selfish” here refers to the paradigmatic homo economicus of neo-classical 
studies, based on the work of utilitarian theorists such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
Selfish behavior is clearly defined by the fundamental works of the fathers of the 
economic discipline, starting with Edgeworth (1881), and continuing with Friedman’s 
(1953; Friedman and Savage, 1948) and Becker’s (1974; 1976) contributions, just to 
mention a few of the most important Authors. The point is that the selfish individual 
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1 It is worth noting that in Administrative Behavior (1947) Simon mentioned the issue of docility, 
although he didn’t developed it further in an analytical way. This is the reason why we refer in the paper 
to the later works.  
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behaves in a fully self-interested and rational way, has an ordered set of preferences, 
and does not care about the other members of the economic system. This approach has 
never left the economic basis for explaining human behavior, and strong traces still 
remain in recent microeconomic work (see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green, 1995). 
In broad terms, altruism refers to someone who gives something, but gains no return 
from the beneficiary of his/her altruistic action. Despite this first and basic assumption, 
the altruist needs someone to reciprocate the action, when the interaction is reiterated 
(Axelrod, 1984). Reciprocity refers to something that the receiver will do, in order to 
praise the altruistic party’s behavior; for example, it could even be another act of 
altruism. Theoretical and empirical experiments seem to confirm reciprocation as 
common behavior within social systems (Axelrod, 1984; see also the recent Yung-An 
and Day-Yang, 2003).  
The international debate on the meaning of altruism and its implications is growing (for 
a review, see Khalil, 2004). In particular, Khalil (2004) defines altruism qua charity, 
stressing that efforts should be directed to promoting an interdisciplinary matrix in order 
to study altruism, since its links with a large number of scientific domains becomes 
particularly evident (Wilkinson, 2004; Lunt, 2004). 
However, if not altruism, social interactions have been addressed by different Authors 
as an important argument for re-defining the basic postulates of microeconomics. In 
particular, it is worth noting that Etzioni’s “I&We” paradigm (1988) is very similar to 
Simon’s concept of docility (as detailed below), when he presented it as the “properly 
socialized” version of the under-socialized neo-classical economic man (1988: 13ff). 
His work The Moral Dimension attempts to found economics on different postulates, 
trying to include the other’s interests in the self. Etzioni criticises the fully-rational 
paradigm and suggests the introduction of non-rational variables, like emotions and 
values, into human behavior modeling. One of the main implications is that 
“[i]ndividuals and community are both completely essential, and hence have the same 
fundamental standing” (1988: 9). This approach leads to the fusion of social and 
economic domains into a new branch that he called “socioeconomics” (1988). 
Another very interesting view is that of Amartya Sen. He defines the two concepts, that 
of “sympathy” and that of “commitment” as necessary tools for understanding human  
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behavior (Sen, 1977: 236). Sen specifies that “[t]he former corresponds to the case in 
which the concern for others directly affects one’s own welfare. If the knowledge of 
torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel 
personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to 
stop it, it is a case of commitment” (1977: 236).  
In other words, “sympathy” arises when someone is interested in improving 
somebody’s conditions, and this will also enhance those of the one who acts. It is a self-
interested behavior.  
On the contrary, when “commitment” occurs then someone feels  that it should be 
morally correct to act in order to improve somebody else’s condition. Hence, it is 
altruistic behavior since the one who acts does not have any (direct or economic) 
improvement of his/her personal condition.  
Commitment belongs to the so called non-rational domain of human cognitive 
capabilities, and it modifies the traditional economic assumptions on human behavior. 
In the sense that commitment is derived from one’s values, it reflects the idea of the 
social system that the individual develops in his personal experience. The analogy with 
Simon’s concept of docility is clearly defined. 
Robert Frank is another pioneer of “heterodox” theories concerning the basic economic 
postulates. In his analytical works (1994) and specifically in his Passions within Reason 
(1988), Frank tries to focus on the role of emotions in human reasoning and in social 
and economic equilibriums. Once again, similarities between Frank’s and Simon’s work 
are wide and interesting (as sustained also by Khalil, 2004). The two provide models in 
order to find the economic nature of altruism, and define the interaction between 
altruistic and selfish individuals, reaching quite different results, however (discussed 
below). 
All these approaches lead to or imply a concept of rationality that breaks with the fully-
rational individual. The concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) is the one that, in 
recent years, has successfully provided the alternative way of thinking about the human 
decision making processes. Our cognitive capacity is limited by external and internal 
elements: (a) the environment plays a crucial role in terms of constraints, and (b) our 
brain cannot perceive and control all the variables because of structural cognitive limits. 
Recent works show difficulties, challenges and, above all, results of the bounded  
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rationality approach (Conlisk, 1996; Foss, 2003).  
Finally, here we follow Simon’s idea on altruism (1993). It is individual tendency to 
interact having both the idea that the other will reciprocate (in some way, in the future) 
and to be open-minded, i.e. to learn from the others (docility). Within these hypotheses, 
altruism is a “technical” word that indicates human thinking in terms of the social 
system. Selfish individuals limit their thoughts   only towards themselves, no matter 
how the system is organized. 
The second section of the paper is dedicated to synthesizing Simon’s theory of altruism. 
In the third section we outline some implications of the model, arguing that its strengths 
are based on strict hypotheses. Further, Simon’s model is modified, using a game theory 
approach, into a game where selfish individuals face altruists. The objective is to define 
a model that can capture some real features, defining a stable relationship between 
selfish and altruistic individuals. In the last section we try to extend some results of the 
models to other disciplinary domains, other than sociology and economics. 
 
2. Simon’s model of altruism 
Simon discusses his theory of altruism in two papers (1990; 1993). The core ideas are 
traced by the bounded rationality hypothesis and the satisficing approach (Simon, 1947; 
1955; 1956; 1979) is used as the basis for explaining human behavior. 
The basic concept is that of fitness. Following a Darwinian approach, the model is based 
on the “survival of the fittest” postulate, that is to say that “[i]f several species inhabit 
the same niche, the fittest will eliminate the others; and species will evolve with the 
appearance of mutants having greater fitness than the original genotype” (Simon, 1993: 
126). In evolutionary biology, fitness relates the altruism hypothesis to the “behavior 
that reduces the actor’s fitness while enhancing the fitness of others” (Simon, 1993: 
126). This is the technical meaning of “altruism”, and it significantly differs from the 
common use of the same term (Knudsen, 2003). 
Sometimes altruistic behavior emerges and contributes decisively to the species’ 
survival, which means, in biological terms, growth in fitness. In some other cases, 
altruism can be limited to a very narrow influence or might eventually disappear. Simon 
suggests that the former case is that of human beings.  
In order to survive, humans are “docile,” in the sense that our fitness is enhanced by  
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cI c cU qU faU cI qI faI dI fd fn fI ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + =
cU qU faU cI qI faI fn fS ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + =
cU c cU qU faU cI qI faI dU fd fn fU ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + =
“the tendency to depend on suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and information 
obtained through social channels as a major basis for choice” (Simon, 1993: 156). In 
other words, we support our limited decision-making capabilities by receiving inputs, 
perceptions, data, and so on, from the social environment. The social context gives us 
the main data filter,
2 available to increase individual fitness. 
To some extent, the concept of “docility” embodies that of altruism, in the sense that 
one cannot be altruistic if they are not docile. That is to say that one cannot be altruistic 
without any impetus toward others in a broad sense (i.e. the social system of 
interactions). This implies that totally selfish individuals are not docile.  
Docility is the core of Simon’s approach, as it postulates that this is the way individuals 
behave in modern human societies, and altruism is likely to develop in docile contexts. 
Since the general gain (fitness) deriving from being docile overcomes the loss of fitness 
related to altruistic actions, altruism will evolve in our society.  
Following the hypotheses of bounded rationality and docility, Simon determines the 
fitness of the selfish (fS) and of the altruistic individual, dividing the intelligent from the 
unintelligent
3 (fI and fU respectively). 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
He specifies that “fn is normal fitness; fd dI and fd dU are increments of fitness for 
docility; faI and faU are increments in fitness from others’ altruism; cI and cU represent 
the extent to which I and U are altruistic; dI and dU denote the abilities of I and U to 
benefit from docility; qI and qU are percentages of I and U in the population. The cost 
of altruism is c” (Simon, 1993: 157-158). 
Evidence from the model shows that the selfish individual does not benefit from docility 
fitness “surpluses,” and has less chances of survival. This chance of survival derives 
from the costs of altruistic actions that, as stated in the “technical” definition, must be 
taken as deteriorations in fitness. If these costs of the intelligent and unintelligent 
                                                 
2 I do not use, voluntarily, the term “information” that relates to the cerebral activity of data decrypting 
and interpreting. 
3 The difference between the intelligent and the unintelligent altruistic individual is related to their degree 
of altruistic behaviour. The intelligent are less altruistic, in the sense that they can differentiate among 
different actions, while the unintelligent behaves altruistically without any distinction. Not being able to 
discriminate between different alternatives classifies  unintelligent behaviour.  
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altruists are compensated by the docility effect and the fitness surpluses derived from 
the effects of altruistic behavior of the others, the altruists will be the fittest individuals. 
In the opposite case, their proportion in the total population will soon decline. 
However, human beings are social individuals where being social means to be docile. If 
docility will appear to foster altruism as a way to enhance the general social fitness, then 
altruists (the intelligent ones) will be fitter than the selfish individuals. 
Equations (1), (2), and (3) define the framework through which the social system 
evolves. Selfish individuals are defined as the stereotype of the economic actor, as in 
neoclassical economics. This homo economicus is not docile, by definition. He/she 
cannot even imagine behaving without a direct personal return, so that altruism is not 
contemplated. Also docility is not part of his/her world because it is grounded on a bias 
toward the others, and a selfish individual does not depend on others, strictu sensu. This 
independence (only possible in experimental thoughts) leads him/her to found reasoning 
only on his/her thoughts and personal cognitive achievement. This is a typical 
competitive disadvantage in a world where the altruists also learn through the social 
system. 
Simon assigns values to parameters
4 and assumes that the population is equally 
distributed between the three individuals, in the period zero (the first period). After 30 
generations, the fitness-related interactions lead to a strong prevalence of intelligent 
altruists (53%), to a sensible decrease in the selfish (18%), while the unintelligent 
altruists manifest a slower disappearance (29%). 
The intelligent altruist is the fittest. However, the most important element seems to be 
docility more than altruism. This can also be derived from the initial hypotheses, as 
docility is a necessary condition in order to make altruism emerge. However, values 
attributed to parameters in the model show that the main contribution is supported by 
the ability of the intelligent altruist to gain advantage from docile behavior. Of course, 
the costs of altruism impact only on I and U. Thus, docility makes I fitter than the 
others, considering altruism as a kind of side-effect of it. 
The “technical” definition of altruism that Simon gives in the first part of his paper 
becomes complete when docility elements are inserted. Within this framework, altruism 
integrates a sort of social identity, manifested at the single individual level. The 
                                                 
4 The values are attributed as follows: “fn = 1.01; fd = 0.02; c = 0.005; faI = 0.01; faU = 0.005; q0I = 1/3; 
q0S = 1/3; p0U = 1; dI = 2; cI = 0.8; cU = 1; dU = 1.” (Simon, 1993: 158).  
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individual behaves altruistically because it perceives that being part of a social group 
involves taking direct actions toward an increase in the total fitness (i.e. the whole 
group fitness). 
In other terms, this is not a simple theory of the “altruism paradox”. On the contrary, 
this is a theory of docile society where altruism is more diffused than previously 
thought in standard economic theories. Docility fosters altruism, and this is what makes 
social interaction possible. 
 
3. Challenges to the basic model 
The concept of docility as an explanatory bias for social systems. Belonging to Khalil 
(2004), Simon’s theory of altruism can be defined as ‘altercentric,’ within the 
framework of interactional rationalistic theories of altruism. This group of theories is 
called “interactional because, despite their differences, they model action on the 
standard economic approach, viz., as the outcome of optimization” (Khalil, 2004: 99). 
In particular, the altercentric perspective “can account for resource sharing where the 
agent does not stand to collects a benefit in egoistic form or in the egocentric form. It 
maintains that the agent, at least in some occasions, may share income because he is 
built with a pro-social trait. However, such a trait is not modeled as the desire to 
enhance the welfare of recipient, but rather modeled as springing form, what one may 
call, a moral gene” (102; emphasis added).  
Simon’s theory is typically biological in his basic elements (Sesardic, 1995), as it refers 
to conditions for the evolution of the population (species). Sesardic distinguishes 
between psychological altruism and evolutionary altruism, even if they are related 
(1995: 130). From this point of view, Simon refers to evolutionary biological altruism 
as it is not related to the contingency of cultural and traditional elements. However, 
giving altruism a social bias means transferring the evolutionary discourse into the 
everyday interaction between individuals. Social interactions imply cultural, political, 
economic, moral, and psychological elements that intervene in determining the way 
people behave. Thus docility goes ahead in describing evolutionary altruism, and this is 
one of the points addressed in the discussion. In other terms, we praise Khalil’s 
emphasis on the need for interdisciplinary efforts in order to analyze the altruism 
phenomenon, and human behavior in general.  
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Simon’s simple model opens the borders of narrow neoclassical economics. Docility (or 
“socializability,” as in 1990) is the basis of human acquisition of knowledge, because it 
basically consists of cognitive delegations to other society members. In other terms, 
from our birth we operate this kind of delegation, first to our parents, and then to other 
people. After that we begin to select between people from which to learn something 
important or insignificant, and the level of a personal role in acquiring information 
becomes ever higher.  
The item here is twofold. In the first instance, people delegate data acquisition to their 
experience and to the external resources and individuals (Magnani, 2001). On the 
second, this implies that people do trust others (Magnani, 2005). Moreover, from a 
neurological point of view, we can infer that “a big cortex can provide an evolutionary 
advantage only in presence of a massive storage of meaningful information and 
knowledge on external supports that only an already developed small community of 
human beings can possess. […] If we consider high-level consciousness as related to a 
high-level organization […] of human cortex, its origins can be related to the active role 
of environmental, social, linguistic, and cultural aspects” (14). Thus, “docile” 
interaction lays on the very basis of our social (and neurological) development. 
These two conditions imply that without a significant level of trust this “docile” process 
is not possible at all. It is very high during the first phases of our lives, then decreases or 
increases depending on the group in which we operate (e.g. family, firm, association, 
political party, church, etc.). It is clear that the “docile” individual is, in the technical 
meaning here used, the same as the properly socialized individual (Etzioni, 1988), or the 
individual displaying “pro-social” behavior (Khalil, 2004). 
H1. People that behave altruistically pass the docility effect to the overall members of 
society. 
 
It is worth noting that social behavior seems to be much more fundamental than usually 
thought, both for humans and animals (especially for the other primates; Humphrey, p. 
307). Following Humphrey, we can affirm that docility and altruism make the 
“transmission of information” and “individual learning” possible. Then, the first 
hypothesis is concerned with underlining this essential role of docility for the overall 
members of society. 
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Neo-Darwinism in Evolutionary Theories and in Social Sciences. Another point to be 
discussed in Simon’s model is that of applying Darwinism, in its pure form, to 
economics and, in general, to the social sciences. Darwinism is eminently a biological 
concept, and its automatic application to the characters of social evolution may lead to 
distortions (Sesardic, 1995).  
The first reason relates to the concept of natural selection, in the formulation accepted in 
Simon’s view. It is mechanical in its essence, as it refers to the organism’s adaptation to 
a specific environment (niche). The hypothesis is that when different organisms strive 
for survival, only the fittest will survive while the others will disappear. This approach 
encounters numerous difficulties if transposed to social and psychological behavior, 
where mechanical relations very often do not apply (Simon, 1979; Frank, 1987). Thus, 
social evolution is modified by biological bias (i.e. genes), but only in the long run, and 
the mechanical application of Darwinism to the social sciences (economics in 
particular) needs at least to be clarified. 
H2.  The process of “social selection” of behaviors that fit is not mechanical, nor 
deterministic in its essence.  
 
The second reason to question the neo-Darwinian approach to social systems refers to 
recent developments in the field that challenge the “survival of the fittest” concept. 
Some Authors suggest that evolution does not work exactly as Darwin thought. The 
evolutionary process is more dynamic than mechanical, so that we find many options, 
even if they are not actual options (Maturana and Varela, 1984).
5 The basic concept here 
is that of co-evolution (1984: 92ff), that is the way in which the organism and the 
environment find a mutual variation. The organism modifies its character in order to 
reach better fitness; however, the environment equally, is not insensible to 
modifications. Within this complex system of changes, many organisms might fit the 
same environment (niche), which is neither stable nor insensible with regard to the 
organisms which live in it.  
The number of evolutionary possibilities relates to environmental change and the 
adaptation process that founds co-evolution. It means that evolution is not 
“deterministic” (in classic terms), but dynamic and adaptive. Nonetheless, this concept 
                                                 
5 Going back to Mendel, sometimes we find “recessive genes” or “characters” in the group or species. 
That is to say that the individual with lower fitness does not entirely disappear.  
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can be found, somehow, in Darwin’s works, as Maturana and Varela pointed out, 
implying that the major responsibility lays on neo-Darwinism and on the scientific 
vulgate of the Master’s work. Hence, absorbing these concepts into the model may lead 
to distortions in the understanding of social interactions. 
The other point is more disruptive (to some extent, it breaks with orthodox Darwinian 
tradition). Maturana and Varela found that, if evolution follows a dynamic and adaptive 
approach, the rule of the “survival of the fittest” does not entirely apply (1984: 103). In 
fact, the individual that is nearest to the environmental conditions (and even its changes) 
shall survive. It is not the “fittest” in absolute terms, but the one that shows its 
conditions to be more suited to that specific environment (niche), as specified by the 
concept of co-evolution. This is a “relative” and dynamic approach to evolutionary 
biology that can be successfully adapted to theories of social and economic behavior. 
Moreover, it seems to be very similar to the “satisficing approach,” in its biological 
application. In fact, relativity means that the biological organism does not have a clear 
perception of the overall natural and social variables, and it adapts itself in order to be 
part of the natural and social system. A model of docile behavior needs to embed these 
concepts of dynamic adaptations, and to open towards the possible survival of different 
organisms in the same niche. 
H3. The social context is based on the survival of adapted individuals, hence we do not 
find the one best survivor, but we might have the contemporary presence of different 
individuals in the same environment (niche).  
 
One of the implications of Simon’s assumptions on Darwinism can be seen directly 
from the model. If we do not limit the calculus on population growth and ratios, and 
extend it indefinitely, we find that the fittest will survive, and that the others with lower 
fitness will gradually disappear. After 60 interactions the selfish decrease to 8.7%, while 
the unintelligent altruists stand on 21%, and the intelligent reach 70.3%. The other 
results are shown in Table 1 (the basis for calculations are those written in the previous 
pages). 
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Table 1 – Population movements of I, U, and S in n interactions
6 
Periods  Intelligent altruist  Selfish  Unintelligent altruist 
1  33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
30  52.7% 18.5% 28.8% 
60 70.3%  8.7%  21.0% 
100 86.0%  2.6%  11.4% 
199 98.2%  0.0%  1.7% 
344 99.9%  0.0%  0.0% 
721 100.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Source: Our data on Simon’s (1993) hypotheses. 
 
The table clearly shows that the intelligent altruist, after 721 generations, will be the 
only individual in society. The result should be the same even if starting from other 
ratios in the population. The first, and obvious, result is that the model does not reach 
any equilibrium between the three (in Pareto-efficiency terms), since the intelligent 
altruist only will survive. The second result is that the one who survives is the fittest 
individual, as Darwin’s approach can confirm.  
However, we cannot deny that selfish (i.e. totally selfish, but intelligent) individuals do 
exist in our societies. From this point of view, Simon’s model is a sort of approximation 
that fails to give a coherent impression of the society where we all live. Furthermore, if 
the “survival of the fittest” should be substituted by the “survival of the more adaptable” 
view, then we cannot exclude selfish behavior as it can be the “more adaptable” in 
relation to eventual future social dynamics.
7 
If these arguments are consistent, the model fails to address three important points: (1) it 
fails to record that docility leads to important fitness effects on everybody (and not only 
for altruists); (2) the model needs to go beyond the mere application of neo-Darwinism, 
i.e. “mechanical” determinism; (3) it also needs to encounter the potential contemporary 
survival of diverse organisms (or individuals) within the same environment (niche).  
For these and other reasons that will be explained below, we decided to modify Simon’s 
model. The objective is that of reaching a model of real interplay between actors. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The sum of percentages shown in lines five and six (periods 199 and 344) do not reach 100%, leaving a 
marginal 0.1% error. The reason is that values 0.0% are approximated to zero, but they are not so far from 
it. On the contrary, the last line shows 100% because we are approximating values with ten and six zeroes 
after comma. 
7 Of course, we cannot imagine that fully-selfish individuals exist, just as we cannot presume the 
existence of fully-altruistic individuals. The model approximates human behaviors into variables, as 
common in economic modeling.  
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4. A model of docile society 
Since Simon began working on bounded rationality (1947), economic modeling has 
improved at a very high level, leading to the improvement of the discipline. However, 
we want to remember Hayek’s advice on analyzing social and economic variables. With 
reference to the engineers of economics, he stated that exchanges in the economy are 
basically the opinions of the interacting individuals. Market prices, for example, express 
the opinion of the seller on the fair value that a good or service has, and might not 
match the opinion of the buyer. Therefore, we cannot analyze the price volatility just as 
if it were a gas molecule (Hayek 1975). Economics is fundamentally a study of human 
nature (Marshall 1921). 
This premise leads directly to the sense we attribute to our model. It is a means (or a 
tool) that provides us with useful representation of the interactions we suppose 
individuals have. In no case do we assume that the model exactly mirrors actual human 
interactions; moreover, the main variables assume significance only if reported to the 
general theoretical background here exposed. In other terms, we suppose that the fully-
selfish or the fully-altruist individuals do not exist, so that players in the model reflect 
the trend to behave either mainly altruistically or selfishly. 
The first move from Simon’s model to the one here presented is that of changing actors 
and the scheme of interactions. If we assume that the fully-selfish and the fully-altruist 
(or docile) individual does not exist, then the two actors are just approximations, and 
“altruist” or “selfish” elements have to be intended as the dominance of the first or the 
second character within the individual. Therefore, there is no need to assume an 
unintelligent altruist, because the altruistic action might be rational or not (in the sense 
that goal-attainment is, more or less, the matter of evaluation) depending on the 
situation, i.e. on environmental variables and personal resources. Capabilities vary from 
individual to individual and even the “unintelligent” can behave in an intelligent way, 
depending on the circumstances.  
Another reason not to consider the unintelligent individual is the ordinary rule followed 
by economists: we assume that if the model is consistent for two actors, it should be so 
also for more than two of them. In the end, the unintelligent altruist seems to be both 
insignificant, to the extent that it is implied in the behavior of the other two, and 
unnecessary, if starting with a simpler model.  
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The structural ideas developed in the model are taken from the work of Robert Frank 
(1994: 256ff); the attempt is to match his “Hawks and Doves” model to Simon’s (Frank, 
1994: 256-257).  
We switch Simon’s docility model of evolutionary change into an interactive game 
between two players, the selfish (S) and the altruist (A).
8 The payoff (fitness, f) of the 
two individuals are described as follows: 
(4) 
(5) 
The fitness level of S and A depends on the probability for A to meet A or S, and vice-
versa. Then, the equations express probability to meet an altruist or a selfish individual; 
this incidence will depend on the quantity of altruists or selfish individuals in the 
population.  
The parameters are defined as follows: qS and qA refer to the percentages of population 
of A and S in a given period; PSw and PSl stand for the payoff of a selfish individual 
meeting another selfish individual, and respectively winning or losing; PA stays for the 
altruist meeting another altruist payoff; dA expresses the docility effect.  
Moreover, when S meets A, suppose that S is really capable of having a great advantage 
from A’s behavior. Therefore, the effect of altruism is enhanced and expressed by the 
PA multiplied by the x. In addiction, consider that the effect of being docile applies also 
to the selfish. Docility is typically a character that pertains to the individual. However, if 
it can be defined as the social “vision” of the altruistic individual, then it should be 
possible to think about the effects of docile behavior on the society overall. This implies 
a multiplier effect on the altruist-meeting-a-selfish individual payoff, i.e. the selfish one 
is a free rider. 
On the contrary, we suppose that when A meets S it is possible to recognize a little 
altruism. This is a sort of side-effect of taking always self-oriented actions, in the sense 
that even a selfish individual cannot take into account all of the impacts deriving from 
its behavior. The y has a discount effect on the value of the winning selfish payoff 
(PSw). In other words, we suppose that a little portion of selfish actions have an impact 
                                                 
8 To some extent, the original model can also be viewed as an interactive game where each player is 
associated to a probability of meeting the others in relation to their success, i.e. fitness and population 
growth or decrease.  
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on the other members of society, despite the intentions of the player. This is a realistic 
assumption since, for example, a shopkeeper can clean the sidewalk near her/his shop in 
order to give customers a better welcome; while in any case, most of the citizens 
passing along the sidewalk receive benefit from this self-directed action. It is a kind of 
positive externality effect (Coase, 1960) or positive external economy (Pigou, 1950). 
The docility effect does apply only to altruists. In this case, the fitness of A is enhanced 
by a relative competitive advantage for survival because S doesn’t have it at all. The 
hypothesis is that S tries to improve his/her presence in society through the optimizing 
process. That is to say that S gives a value to every alternative in order to choose the 
best way to optimize the variables. A’s behavior differs from this because his/her goal is 
twofold, as he/she (1) tries to find a way for survival, and (2) gives a major relevance to 
variables of the social context (i.e. the others).
9 
This view suggests that, in the struggle for survival, the altruist always gives something, 
no matter if she/he comes into contact with another altruist or with a selfish individual. 
On the contrary, the selfish individual doesn’t give anything to anyone (except for the 
above mentioned side-effect) and, uses optimizing mechanisms, trying to reach very 
high benefits from the altruists. Moreover, the interaction between selfish individuals 
can be positive or negative, i.e. it can be costly or provide a high return in terms of 
fitness. Since the selfish entity does not pay for altruist actions, and he/she is not docile 
(or does not display pro-social behavior), he/she has the same probability of gaining or 
loosing positions when meeting another selfish person (PSw or PSl). 
We decided not to highlight the costs of altruism, as they appear in Simon’s 
expressions. The reason is very simple, and refers to the fact that they can be integrated 
in the return parameters. Therefore, we consider net-revenues (or payoffs), i.e. netted by 
costs. Thus, the net costs of the game can be expressed as follows: 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
It is clear from the equation that the net payoff for one altruist derives from the gross 
payoff for another altruist (GPA) to which the costs of the action are subtracted (cA). 
We also suppose that even selfish individuals support, to some extent, costs due to their 
                                                 
9 The latter is similar to Sen’s concept of “sympathy” while the former is nearer to “commitment.”  
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actions, so that the winning selfish payoff (PSw) is netted by the costs of the action, 
discounted at y ratio. On the contrary, the losing selfish payoff (PSw) is simply netted by 
the costs of the selfish action. Finally, we follow Simon and the common hypotheses on 
the costs supposing that the selfish action is cheaper than the altruistic one (cS > cA). 
The first equation shows what should be the average level of fitness (or the average 
payoff) that selfish and altruistic individuals gain from living in a context that follows 
the above mentioned hypotheses. These results, however, have to be related to the 
population growth, since we want to know if docility causes altruists to survive or die. 
Additional hypotheses have to be done. 
Suppose that the average payoff, i.e. the level of fitness (fA and fS), leads to better 
conditions of survival. This means that if the value of fS is higher than fA, then the 
selfish percentage in society will increase (q1S > q0S) at a given rate of growth (g); vice-
versa, if fA > fS, then altruists will increase, at the same rate (g). Since this is an 
interactive game, where players meet following simple behavioral hypotheses, we 
suppose the rate of growth to be the same for the two types of players. This assumption 
does not affect the evolutionary significance of the model, as one can presume that the 
reproductive “mechanisms” are the same for every woman and man. The reproductive 
system works effectively if social conditions permit it, otherwise the other type of 
individual will advance.  
However, it is also possible to think in terms of possible changes, i.e. the possibility that 
a selfish individual will become an altruist and the other way round. Some 
terminological modifications could be needed, in that case. 
In formal terms, the S and the A population in period 1 (q1) are defined in the following 
expressions (9 and 10), under the constraints that the first (9) is valid only if fS > fA, 
and the second (10) only if fA > fS: 
(9) 
(10) 
As the hypotheses are different, we cannot apply the values Simon’s gave to his model. 
Hence, for example, suppose that: qS = 0.5; PSw = 0.08; PSl = -0.1; PA = 0.008; dA = 
0.04; x = 6.3
10; y = 0.01; g = 0.02. Then, after the first 46 interactions, the social system 
finds the equilibrium with qS  = 3.5%. The model shows how such a system will 
                                                 
10 This value is very high in order to integrate S’s ability to keep advantage on A, and also to take into 
account the free riding effect, that means general costs reduction.  
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improve living conditions for altruists, while leaving selfish individuals a reduced role.  
Moreover, it supports the hypothesis that, even in the social systems dominated by 
altruism, the selfish do not disappear, even if they cover a very limited role in the game. 
However, the latter might increase in number when the system changes its conditions, 
registered in parameter modifications. 
 
5. The end of selfish economy 
The new model obtained addresses the major points discussed in the previous section. 
In particular, it integrates the effect of docility on every society member, as selfish 
members can also take advantage of the altruist’s behavior. This point is, to some 
extent, also present in the original model. However, we tried to give it a specific 
emphasis in the discussion and in the main variables of the model. 
Our model doesn’t strictly follow the neo-Darwinism theory. It is not “mechanical” or 
“determinist” in a classical meaning; on the contrary, the attempt to base it on game 
theory gives it a probabilistic background. This means that the model follows social 
modifications, as it is open to modify the results if environmental and individual 
conditions change.  
Furthermore, the “survival of the fittest” thesis is abandoned, as the results show that 
different individuals can survive in the same environment (niche). Different conditions 
in environment and in individual behavior lead to different payoffs that open the way to 
other survival strategies and fitness equilibriums between the players. 
Problems arising from Simon’s theory of docility were fundamentally those of (1) 
explaining the permanence of selfish individuals in docile societies, and (2) avoiding the 
hypothesis of social Darwinism. The new model encounters these problems as part of its 
hypotheses, and can be interpreted as a partial solution of them. 
The model reaches its equilibrium, leaving little space to selfish individuals, so that self-
interested people are set aside. This element does not imply that self-interest will be 
relegated to a marginal role in the future but that, under the conditions that we find at 
present in our society, it is. In other terms, the model is not a foreteller; it is behavioral-
descriptive. In fact, as Simon’s model, it has to be modified in case of environmental 
conditions changes. It provides a good estimation only if we suppose that the interplay 
between the actors will continue on the basis of those parameters’. However, if we are  
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confident about the parameters’ consistency, then we have a fair description of our 
society. 
To be more precise on this point, we also suggested, in order to test H1, that “one of the 
chief functions of society is to act as it were as a ‘polytechnic school’ for the teaching of 
subsistence technology. The social system serves the purpose in two ways: (i) by 
allowing a period of prolonged dependence during which young animals, spared the 
need to fend for themselves, are free to experiment and explore; and (ii) by bringing the 
young into contact with older, more experienced members of the community from 
whom they can learn by imitation (and perhaps, in some cases, from more ‘formal 
lessons’)” (Humphrey, 1976: 310). This appears very clearly in the model, as “the 
resulting mix of old and young, caretakers and dependents, sisters, cousins, aunts and 
grandparents not only calls for considerable social responsibility but also has potentially 
disruptive social consequences. The presence of dependents (young, injured or infirm) 
clearly calls at all times for a measure of tolerance and unselfish sharing” (Humphrey, 
1976: 310). We can argue that this “measure of tolerance and unselfish” behavior must 
be incredibly widened in our societies since it is fundamental for their survival. The 
“measure” might increase or decrease in relation to the environment, time and other 
variables.
11 
The hypotheses here tested seem to have implications on three levels, at least, so that 
this model, or a more developed one, can be applied to specific fields of social sciences.  
The most direct level to which we can refer to is the system, though it is also the one we 
tried to describe in the paper. If the docile-altruist character is dominant, then selfish 
and fully-rational economics faces a serious challenge. The interaction between two 
dominant individual types leaves neo-classical economics a marginal role in normative 
and prescriptive terms. However, this is a highly challenging domain where new models 
and approaches need to be developed. Time has passed since the first Authors 
denounced the neo-classical theoretical derive, and modeling and approaches have been 
developed (see, for example, Frank, 1988; Simon, 1958). The new institutionalism in 
economics, as in sociology and politics (for a review, see Scott, 2001), provides us with 
very useful concepts for “complicating” traditional models (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; Williamson, 1975).  
                                                 
11 From this point of view, we don’t see “moral education” as a “form of coercion” (Yung-An and Day-
Yang, 2003: 683).  
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The docile approach here described has its most significant implications mainly at the 
organization level, as it can be used, for example, to explain why different types of 
organizations survive within the same environment (niche). If we define “selfish” and 
“altruist” as a way in which to define organizational external behavior, we find that the 
whole theory of externalities, both positive and negative, can be understood as 
prevalence of the first or of the second character. Finally, the organization needs to be 
docile in order to fit the environment. In other terms, its behavior has to be “socially 
oriented,” in the sense that we explained in the paper, i.e. “the tendency to depend on 
suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and information obtained through social 
channels as a major basis for choice” (Simon, 1993: 156). This approach can also give a 
very significant role to organizational sociology and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) studies. From this viewpoint, CSR becomes the study of docility as it applies to 
corporations (Secchi, forthcoming). 
The third level to which the docility approach and the model can be applied is that of 
the individual. As mentioned in the paper, selfishness and altruism might be addressed 
to the same individual, as his/her behavior may follow the former or the latter 
inclination. The individual cannot be thought of as being the same over time and giving 
the same answers even to the same environmental stimulus. This is further complicated 
by environmental and individual changes (the concept of co-evolution is worth noting 
here). In order to integrate these hypotheses in explaining individual behavior, the 
model (and the approach here stressed) can be useful in deriving which behavior will 
prevail, under certain external conditions. This is a challenge to neo-classical 
microeconomics too, as shown by Foss (2003). A new model of human cognition seems 
to be needed in order to integrate non-rational and only apparently non-rational behavior 
(Etzioni, 1988; Frank, 1988). However, this is not sufficient as rationality doesn’t 
appear to be consistent with docility and altruistic behavior; hence, recent advancements 
in cognitive science can be useful for defining a new model of rational choice 
(Margolis, 1981; Bardone and Secchi, 2005). Moreover, trustworthiness and docility 
effects are enhanced in restricted contexts, such as within organizations, so further 
studies need to be directed there too. 
Finally, altruism and docility seem to be two important concepts for social and 
economic reasoning. Many advances appear possible if we think of applying them to  
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psychological, social, political and, mostly, economic domains. 
In order to be more precise, “[e]conomic theory has treated economic gain as the 
primary human motive. An empirically grounded theory would assign comparable 
weight to other motives, including altruism and the organizational identifications 
associated with it. The theory would recognize that human motives change over time, 
responding to experience and surprises of history. Individuals do not form their 
preferences in isolation from other individuals, but in response to both public events and 
information that is widely broadcast. Theory must make room for tulip crazes, 
responses to oil shocks, or the unexpected rise of ethnicity. Instead of political science 
or history as derivative from economics analysis, there is a need for economics based 
upon the facts of history and political social life. [...] Altruism, especially altruism 
derived from group and organizational loyalties, will play a major role in it” (Simon, 
1993: 160).   
This is a very stimulating research program to which we will dedicate our future 
interests, starting with an empirical evaluation of the model. 
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